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Brexit Dilemmas: New opportunities and tough choices in unsettled times 
Abstract 
Concluding the BJPIR’s Brexit special issue, this article seeks to set the unsettled times and unexpected 
events associated with the Brexit in historic context and tease out the prospects for a ‘bespoke’ UK exit 
agreement.  Drawing on classics of social science history – by Barrington Moore, Gourevitch and Davis 
- it reflects on ‘suppressed historic choices’ and historical periodisations. Three key dilemmas are in-
terrogated: the Brexit dilemma (control of immigration/regaining of sovereignty vs. EU market ac-
cess); the Brexiteers’ dilemma (sustaining economic prosperity while restricting immigration); and 
the Remainers/soft Brexit dilemma (of weakening Parliamentary democracy by staying in the Single 
Market).  
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Introduction 
The years 2016 and 2017 were particularly unsettled in the UK. Political events were difficult to read 
and firm conclusions hard to draw. Risky at the best of times, prediction was a perilous business for 
media commentators and social scientists.  There was, though, a wide consensus on one point: the im-
plications of Brexit were transformative, at least for the UK and probably for Europe and the wider 
world.  Many commentators and politicians - supporters as well as opponents - turned to superlatives 
to evoke these transformations.  Indefatigable BBC political editor Laura Kuenssberg (2017) called it 
'the biggest challenge we have faced since the Second World War'.ii  David Davis (2016), Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union and longstanding Conservative Eurosceptic, has described it as 
the 'biggest change for a generation'.  While evaluating the implications of Brexit differently, promi-
nent pro-EU politicians share Davis’ sense of Brexit's significance.  For Ken Clarke - who has held a hat-
ful of Cabinet posts, including Chancellor of the Exchequer and Home Secretary - it could prove to be a 
'historic disaster'. Europhiles' superlatives describe what they see as the mismanagement of Brexit.  
Clarke has said that he has 'never seen anything as mad or chaotic' as the Government's approach to 
leaving the EU (Addley, 2017), a striking claim from the UK's longest serving MP.  Former Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg (2017) has described Brexit as  'the biggest con trick in politics' with a 'very 
narrow victory' taken 'in the most uncompromising and damaging way possible'.  
 
In the introduction to this BJPIR special issue Wincott et al. (2017) considered how far in the UK’s 
choice reflected general trends in Europe and around the world towards populism and system-
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challenging politics (see also Hopkin, 2017, Wilson, 2017) and the ways in which it might trigger or 
reinforce political tendencies of this kind.  While (at the time of writing) the sense that an immediate 
contagion from Brexit to populist Eurosceptics elsewhere in Europe faded, important underlying 
sources of instability arguably remain. Emmanuel Macron’s electoral successes in France were critical 
to the early summer 2017 renewed optimism in Brussels about the EU. Yet Macron’s success also illus-
trates the weakness of conventional and established party politics. Unsettled times are not limited to 
the UK. They do not always benefit Eurosceptics.   
 
This article is focused on the UK. After the introduction, it develops three major sections. The next re-
flects on issues on contingency, inevitability and the potentially historic consequences of Brexit.  The 
second substantive section considers unsettled times in 2016 and 2017.  The final section touches on 
external and internal challenges posed to the UK state by Brexit. They are linked by a core question 
about the capacity of the state.  Brexit needs to be set in the context of a reduction in the size of White-
hall. The Institute for Government has tracked Civil Service capacity for Brexit, finding that numbers 
fell during early 2016. By September 2016 Whitehall was smaller than it had been since 1939 (Boon, 
2016).  The section addresses external (trade and security) Brexit challenges and then three internal 
issues: devolution, the internal structure of the UK state and the possibilities of secession; the relation-
ship of Brexit of electoral and party dynamics across the UK; and the prospects for UK political econo-
my.  
 
The remainder of this introduction considers the overarching dilemmas raised by Brexit for the UK.  
First, a difficult choice may need to be made between retaining access to EU markets on the one hand 
and gaining control of (or reducing) immigration while eliminating the authority of EU institutions 
over the UK (particularly Court of Justice, but also the Commission) on the other.  This ‘Brexit dilem-
ma’ is clearly reflected in UK public attitudes: clear majorities exist for reducing/controlling immigra-
tion and expansive access to EU markets.  Both the Labour and Conservative party leaders have sought 
to evade the terms of the Brexit dilemma. Jeremy Corbyn, for Labour, has insisted that the UK end free 
movement of people and leave the Single Market while aiming for extensive access to that Market in 
the name of a ‘Jobs First’ Brexit.  As Prime Minister (PM), Theresa May has targeted a ‘deep and spe-
cial’ and ‘bespoke’ Brexit, while robustly insisting on full exit from the Single Market and Customs Un-
ion and allowing no post-exit role for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). But, from the 
EU side, the choice appears stark: accept current arrangements (such as the Single Market) on existing 
terms, or relinquish any privileged access to them.  
 
Other dilemmas nest below this general choice. Robust advocates of Brexit and those who prefer Re-
main or the softest possible form of Brexit each face difficult choices.  A ‘Brexiteers’ dilemma’ concerns 
sustaining economic growth while restricting immigration (the obverse of Parker’s (2017) ‘progres-
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sive’s dilemma’).  The UK faces deep political economy challenges, including low productivity exacer-
bated by a territorially unbalanced economy.  Low and weakly improving productivity makes expand-
ing the labour force a key driver of economic growth.  The UK economy may have become structurally 
reliant on immigration (see Thompson, 2017), which is a ready source of new workers who may also 
be particularly skilled and/or productive. Perhaps that is why some libertarian free traders endorse a 
permissive approach to migration, although influential free trade Brexiteers have made a sharp dis-
tinction between skilled and unskilled immigrants (Ashton et al., 2016). In principle, global free ad-
justment of all factors of production would include labour.  Of course, this approach does not address 
political demands for Brexit based on anxiety about immigration (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; 
Thompson, 2017).  Equally, while a freewheeling capitalist approach to the UK economy might trigger 
a positive transformation of its prospects, that transformation - perhaps through a Schumpeterian 
(1942) ‘gale of creative destruction’ - could prove socially and politically unsettling (see Hopkin, 
2017). May’s approach to the Brexiteers’ dilemma has been much more interventionist.  Grounded in 
an Industrial Strategy, its aim was to use government power to build up domestic sources of prosperi-
ty and enhance the skills and productivity of UK workers. To succeed, it would have to ‘solve’ the UK’s 
productivity problem – a difficult challenge that would take time to overcome.  
 
 ‘Remainers’ also face a deep challenge in addressing widespread public concern about immigration. 
Political disillusion seems to have motivated many Brexiteers, particularly a hostility towards the so-
cially detached ‘Westminster elite’. It would surely deepen should the basic decision to ‘leave’ be re-
versed.  But Remainers’ ‘softness dilemma’ has a different, and more political, focus.  Chalmers (2017) 
shows that the UK’s EU membership weakened representative democracy in the UK – and, unless clear 
steps are taken to address the role of legislatures, the process of Brexit is likely to weaken it further.  
The dilemma is that the soft form of Brexit – to allow the UK economy as much as possible to keep 
running on its current rails – entails a deeper challenge to the UK’s democratic institutions.  When the 
UK leaves the EU, its political institutions lose their capacity to help shape its rules and processes. 
Chalmers suggests that the UK may find it difficult to move away from EU rules and regulations.  Even 
so, the softer the form of Brexit, the tighter the enduring EU-based constraints are likely to be.  
 
The ‘historic’ character of Brexit 
Brexit raises questions of determinism and contingency on the one hand and periodisation on the oth-
er. First, analytically, transformative moments beg questions about inevitability and contingency, de-
terminism and choice (see Thompson, 2017).  When we are close to events, their fragility, complexity 
and contingency seem clear.  After time has passed – and when painted onto a larger historical and 
geographical canvas – the choices and alternatives that seemed tangible in real time tend to fade away.  
In his macro-comparative historical sociology of Injustice, Barrington Moore (1978) conceptualised 
these ‘paths not taken’ as ‘suppressed historical choices’. 
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 Since the referendum was called, the UK and Europe have experienced many moments of contingency 
and switchback.  A different path might have been followed or an apparently defunct alternative might 
have come back to life.  Cameron need not have committed his party to hold a referendum. Its outcome 
could have been different. May might not have become PM.  She did not have to call a general election 
in 2017. Neither the electoral nor governmental outcomes it generated – including the loss of the gov-
ernment’s majority - were inevitable.  For example, after the June 2017 general election, May was 
widely seen as a temporary PM, unlikely to lead her party into the next general election.  She promised 
to stay on as long as her party wanted her to lead.  But when might she leave: before the summer re-
cess – perhaps linked to ‘Repeal Bill’ legislation; around the party conference at the start of the au-
tumn; because of failures to pass core domestic legislation preparatory for Brexit; or due to conflict 
over Article 50 negotiations programmed to end in March 2019?  None of that was clear. 
 
Not all the contingency relevant to Brexit is confined to the UK.  Electoral events elsewhere in Europe 
might also have turned out differently.  A range of anti-EU candidates and parties might have been 
elected.  Most dramatically, of the four candidates who won between 20 and 24 per cent of the first 
round French Presidential vote, two were Eurosceptics. Having won the Presidency – and then a strik-
ing National Assembly majority – Macron became the darling of Brussels.  Yet again, a very different 
result such as a Presidential run-off between Marine Le Pen of the far right Front Nationale and Jean-
Luc Mélenchon (of the hard left La France Insoumise, or ‘France Unbowed’) was not wholly implausi-
ble let alone impossible. It certainly would have generated a very different atmosphere in Brussels and 
the Brexit negotiation context.  
 
A rich range of potential outcomes has seemed to offer ‘real’ possibilities for the UK’s future relation-
ship with the EU.  At the time of writing, they included:  • a rapid Brexit with no deal agreed with the EU;  • a ‘deep and special’ ‘bespoke’ relationship (which might also include a slower and phased tran-
sition to the eventual permanent arrangement);  • a deal based on the EU’s Custom’s Union;  • an agreement similar to Switzerland’s pattern of bilateral deals and arrangements associated 
with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA);  • or something like the ‘Norwegian’ option, perhaps including European Economic Area (EEA) 
membership.   
 
The possibility of rescinding the UK’s choice to leave the EU cannot be wholly excluded.  Equally, 
we should not assume that the EU itself will remain the same throughout the Brexit process. Mac-
ron’s electoral successes in France buoyed the mood of pro-EU Europeans.  The EU might move to 
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deepen integration, whether for a core set of countries or its whole membership.  Or fault-lines 
could appear in the Eurozone, resentment against migrants could strengthen or populist politics 
re-emerge.  And more scope could be created within the EU for the management of migration and 
the movement of people.  
 
Second, if it is transformative, Brexit should be – or at least mark – a turning point between distinct 
periods of some kind. The division of history into periods is a near ubiquitous feature of political anal-
ysis, but explicit and considered use of periodisation as an analytical tool, taking its limits into account, 
is much less common.  Davis (2008) has provided key critical perspectives on periodisation.  She bril-
liantly exposed how largely un-interrogated use of periodisation smuggled ideas about medievalism 
and the middle ages on the one hand, and the era of modernity on the other, into a wide range of con-
temporary analysis.  Of course, simplification and generalisation are an inescapable part of periodisa-
tion and to making sense of transformative change more generally. For more recent times, political 
economy and geopolitics are widely underpinned by periodisations (examples include: les trente glo-
rieuses, the golden age of the welfare state/economic growth/full employment – see Hay and Wincott 
2012, Wincott, 2013; classical imperialism, the cold war). The timing of these periods is so familiar as 
to be taken for granted.  Both the ‘golden age’ and the cold war began after the Second World War.  
They ended respectively around the Oil Crisis and ‘stagflation’ of the mid 1970s and with the liberali-
sation of the Soviet Union and when the Berlin Wall came down at the end of the 1980s.  In relation to 
the welfare state, it is striking both that the nomenclature of an ‘age’ is generally attached to a period 
of less than thirty years and that its ‘end’ coincides fairly closely with the UK joining the European 
Economic Community.  
 
However, the conceptual work done by these periodisations is generally ignored.  When they come to 
be reified, treated as natural historical facts rather than analytical concepts, periodisations easily turn 
into totalising generalisations, which blend social, political and economic features into a homogenised 
epoch.  ‘Epochal generalisations’ (Wincott, 2013) of this kind can distract attention from the potential 
layering and interaction of distinct aspects of society, politics or economics, and the continuities that 
often endure through apparently transformative moments.  At least with respect to political economy 
(which I know better than geopolitics), the question of whether a particular ‘period of time’ consti-
tutes a coherent  period or an ‘age’ generally has not yet been sufficiently addressed.  A related issue 
concerns what precedes or follows a coherent period.  Should we expect episodes or even longer 
phases of muddle and confusion between settled periods?  Close reading of Gourevitch’s distinguished 
analysis of the Politics in Hard Times (1986) is revealing. It shows that, from the late 1900s, the capi-
talist democracies spent more years in ‘muddled times’ of confusion and crisis than they did in ‘nor-
mal’ periods of economic growth (see Hay and Wincott, 2012: 29-30). 
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Does Brexit mark the end of an age or are we in the midst of a muddled phase? It might represent a 
switch from one age to another, or inaugurate a new age after an episode of confusion.  It could be the 
start of unsettled times. We should not assume that Brexit is a moment of generalised ‘epochal’ 
change.  It will surely interact with a range of other features – or layers – of the UK’s economy, politics 
and society.  Some significant continuities with the past are likely to remain. The choice to leave the EU 
and political processes that have followed in its wake may disclose and dramatise limits, ambiguities 
and underlying wicked problems as well as revealing unrecognised and unexpected resilience and 
strength.  It may also bring to light prior features of the UK that analysts had neglected and may en-
dure.  (For example, Chalmers (2017) suggests that EU membership etiolated the practice of repre-
sentative Parliamentary democracy in the UK.  Without an explicit remedy, Brexit may weaken it fur-
ther.) Brexit will also interact with patterns and developments elsewhere in Europe and across the 
world.  
 
Unsettled times, Brexit and the 2017 General Election 
In her analysis of contingency and inevitability in the UK’s choice to leave the EU, Thompson (2017) 
came down on the latter side, but contingency may have played an even larger part.  David Cameron’s 
decision, as PM not to mount a direct attack on his cabinet colleagues on the Leave side was arguably a 
contingent tactical error. In the interest of future Conservative harmony, assuming Remain would win, 
he chose not to tar Boris Johnson and Michael Gove by association with Nigel Farage.  More generally, 
apparent disunity among the Leavers – between the official Vote Leave group and more radical ‘GO 
Movement’ groups (which emerged when ‘Grassroots Out‘ founded by Tory MPs Peter Bone and Tom 
Pursglove with Kate Hoey from Labour, gained support from Leave.EU and the UKIP leadership). Vote 
Leave could maintain some distance from positions associated with GO, like the ‘Breaking Point‘ poster 
unveiled by Farage.  The Remain campaign was weakened by the absence of refractory equivalent to 
GO on the Leave side. 
 
Cameron’s choice to resign after the referendum was not inevitable.  Of the potential candidates to re-
place him, choosing one from the Remain side did not seem likely.  Before being dramatically and deci-
sively undermined by his erstwhile partner Michael Gove, Boris Johnson seemed to be in the strongest 
position to replace Cameron. In the Telegraph on 26 June, Johnson (2016) reached out to Remain vot-
ers, sought to reassure EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, asserted that sovereignty 
rather than immigration was the motivation for Leave voters, and sought to place the UK at the ‘top 
table’ for foreign policy, defence and counter-terrorism.  Even after Johnson and Gove had fallen away 
as candidates, another Leave campaigner, Andrea Leadsom, seemed as likely as May to replace Camer-
on.  Leadsom’s candidature failed after a damaging claim that, as a mother, she was better suited to the 
role than May, a woman with no children.  In the end, May became PM without a formal contest. 
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As PM, May sought to exert control over Brexit, adopting an opposite strategy to that outlined by John-
son.   Her initial approach may have stored up problems, for example for Northern Ireland (Gormley-
Heenan and Aughey, 2017) and Scotland (McHarg and Mitchell, 2017).  Despite the relatively narrow 
margin for Brexit, May did little to engender the consent of the losing side and effectively asserted that 
leaving the EU was the settled will of the people(s) of the UK.  In its own terms, initially the strategy 
was notably effective. Her down-to-earth pragmatism -‘getting on with the job’ - seemed set to suc-
ceed.  The idea of a ‘soft’ Brexit was associated with continued membership of - or unfettered access to 
- the EU’s Single Market, perhaps through EEA membership, like Norway - or only of EFTA, like Swit-
zerland.  As May insisted that the UK would neither participate in the free movement of people nor 
come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, both these options were 
closed off.  She interpreted the referendum as a call for the UK to control its own borders, particularly 
in relation to immigration, and to restore sovereignty by ending the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union over the UK.  Leaving the Customs Union was also seen necessary to free the UK 
to pursue fully independent new trade arrangements beyond Europe. Free trade Brexiteers, such as 
Patrick Minford (2016), pushed for a 'no deal' exit, to be followed by unilateral tariff reductions.  They 
may have expected it would lead to a reduction in the scale of the UK state. May also embraced the 
possibility of 'no deal', although it was probably more a negotiating strategy to create pressure for a 
‘deep and special’ deal than a desired outcome.  Nevertheless, May’s insistence that ‘no deal’ was a via-
ble solution for the UK contributed to the general perception that she was negotiating for a ‘hard’ 
Brexit.  Ironically, had one of the referendum Brexiteers become PM, s/he might have taken less of a 
hard line. 
 
Although hard versus soft Brexit set the terms of discussion, from early on May herself used different 
language.  She set out her stall for a 'bespoke' arrangement.   Any ‘off-the-peg’ alternative would, of 
course, need to be tailored alterations to fit the UK-EU relationship. Even so, May has eschewed   alter-
natives such as the Single Market and/or Customs Union or World Trade Organisation terms.  Instead 
she argued for a ‘deep and special partnership’ with the EU – an idea to which David Davis returned on 
19 June 2017, as Article 50 negotiations started.  It was the first limb of May’s strategy to escape the 
Brexiteers’ dilemma. But achieving this bespoke deal within the tight timeframe for the Article 50 ne-
gotiations was always going to be difficult. For example, in late June 2017 the European Parliament’s 
Brexit lead, Guy Verhofstadt, criticised May’s ‘bespoke’ concept.  He warned that: ‘The more complex 
and bespoke the future agreement is, the longer it will take to agree and the greater the risk of further 
uncertainty’ (cited in Murphy, 2017).    
 
An Industrial Strategy, aimed at enhancing effectiveness and productivity, while rebalancing the UK 
economy, was the second limb of May’s approach.  By enhancing ‘domestic’ productivity and skills, the 
strategy could reduce the UK’s reliance on immigrant workers. But, while easy enough to describe, the 
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virtuous cycle of enhanced productivity, an improving skills base, increased investment and economic 
growth, achieving an upward spiral, is much more tricky.  At the very least, an effective Industrial 
Strategy of this kind would almost certainly take a long time to bear fruit.  Moreover, May’s approach - 
sometimes described as a form of ‘Red Toryism’ - was sharply at odds with robust advocacy of Brexit 
from a libertarian free trade position.   
 
On 18 April, May called a snap general election to be held on 8 June 2017, reversing her prior position 
commitment not to hold an election until 2020. The ‘no election’ position was part of a 'no nonsense' 
political persona: both practical and principled, with the accent on 'getting on with the job' rather than 
'playing politics'.  Initially announced on 30 June 2017, May repeated the commitment in September 
on Andrew Marr's influential BBC Sunday morning politics show. As late as 20 March 2017 her official 
spokesperson said 'There is no change in our position on an early general election, that there isn't go-
ing to be one ... it is not going to happen ....  we have been clear that there isn't going to be an early gen-
eral election and the Prime Minister is getting on with delivering the will of the British people' (Heav-
en, 2017).   
 
Brexit was central to calling the election, although it only played a limited role in the campaign.  Win-
ning a larger parliamentary majority that would run beyond the projected end of Article 50 negotia-
tions would have strengthened May’s position to negotiate a ‘bespoke’ Brexit and pass related legisla-
tion at Westminster.  She sought to capitalise on her personal ratings, the comparatively strong posi-
tion of the Conservative Party, apparent Labour divisions and the perceived weakness and supposed 
limited appeal to traditional voters of its leader, Jeremy Corbyn. 
 
May's snap election gamble backfired spectacularly.  If the Brexit referendum was a surprise, June 
2017’s election result was as remarkable.  Labour gained an additional 32 seats (and a total of 262).  
Meanwhile, a net loss of 13 seats took the Conservatives from 331 seats to 318, below the threshold 
for a majority (326 of 650 MPs). A constraining Westminster arithmetic resulted. The militantly 
Protestant and socially conservative Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) won 10 of 18 seats in Northern 
Ireland, where the party system is wholly distinct from that in the rest of the UK. From June 9 only one 
potentially viable arrangement between political parties existed to generate a government-
constituting majority.  That was a deal between the Conservatives and the DUP (described by May as 
'our friends and allies' on the Friday morning after the election). 
 
Moreover, longstanding divisions in both of the largest UK parties remain deep.  Referendum Remain-
ers made up ‘176 of the current crop of 317’ Conservative MPs after the 2017 election (Owen, 2017), 
while the debate on the Queen’s speech (which set out May’s programme for government), showed up 
Labour divisions.  Chuka Umunna tabled a Queen’s speech amendment to keep the UK in the Single 
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Market, supported by around 50 Labour MPs, including shadow cabinet members later dismissed by 
Corbyn.  These divisions, together with the fact that no single party could command a majority, togeth-
er with the positions taken by various parties on Brexit during the campaign, combined to generate 
considerable confusion around the UK's position for the Article 50 negotiations.  
 
May’s weakened position, and particularly the possibility that she might be replaced as PM - either 
through a change of Conservative Party leadership or as a consequence of another general election – 
makes the negotiation of her preferred ‘bespoke’ Brexit more challenging. As arguments around Brexit 
are likely to feature prominently in any change of this kind, it might be expected also to trigger the re-
set of the UK’s negotiation with the EU.  But any re-setting of the UK stance after the summer of 2017 
would eat further into the (already short) time for negotiations. And contingency planning for this 
eventuality would be tricky.  In these circumstances, instead of a bespoke deal, the UK could be left to 
choose or default to WTO rules, or to begin from an 'off-the-peg' arrangement, perhaps based on the 
Single Market/EEA or Customs Union, which could then be modified or tailored better to fit the UK-EU 
relationship.   
 
These circumstances – together with the sense of threat to Conservative MPs from the Labour revival 
and the desire to avoid another election – made it possible for May to mount a retrieval attempt for 
her Premiership.  At the time of writing, it remained unclear whether May could stay on as PM through 
the Article 50 negotiation period.  She had successfully put a government together, published the Re-
peal Bill (on 13 July) and weathered an initial period in office through to the summer recess of Parlia-
ment (from 21 July).  Subsequent events - both the start of the negotiations and the allied programme 
of domestic legislation under the banner of the Repeal Bill - seem likely to make things still more diffi-
cult for her.  The possibility of a bespoke arrangement - one which would allow the UK to have a deep 
and special economic and security relationship with the EU, while leaving the Single Market and Cus-
toms Union, reducing or eliminating UK payments into the EU and developing new advantageous trade 
relationships with third parties - seems likely to fade (as Verhofstadt’s comments, cited earlier, hint).  
During July 2017 members of the Cabinet rehearsed their views on Brexit (and austerity) publicly, ap-
parently unconstrained by the traditional practice of collective Cabinet responsibility.  Criticism of 
May’s inflexibility – particularly the idea she was unwilling to countenance the CJEU having a role in 
adjudicating any aspect of post-Brexit arrangements – and its limiting impact on the UK’s negotiating 
position were aired publicly by figures close to chief negotiator David Davis (see Stewart, 2017).  In 
early July there were also reports that officials began to press ministers on the Brexit dilemma: con-
fronting government with the choice between market access and control of immigra-
tion/independence from the CJEU (Henley, 2017).  If the scope for a bespoke Brexit does fade, then 
May’s ability to command a majority in the House of Commons could be tested to destruction.  It had 
become hard to imagine her leading a Conservative Government that softened its position on Brexit, 
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the Single Market or Customs Union significantly.  Equally, rejecting these institutions could also un-
dercut her support in Parliament if doing so were to rule out a frictionless border in Ireland, bank 
passporting rights for the City of London and limit Scotland's access to European markets.  
 
In a number of important ways the position of those opposed to Brexit - or at least to its 'harder' forms 
- has been strengthened.  While May played her negotiating cards close to her chest before the elec-
tion, she was willing to countenance a ‘no deal’ exit, and had ruled out maintaining membership of the 
Single Market and Customs Union.  These positions were not widely challenged before the election; 
they have been called back into question since May lost her majority.  By mid-June 2017, the Prime 
Minster had found herself reliant on two groups of territorially distinct Parliamentarians, both with an 
interest in keeping some borders as open as possible.  The DUP are the first group here.  Emotionally 
and expressively they are strong Brexiteers and the only party of government across the UK explicitly 
to adopt a pro-Brexit policy in the 2016 referendum. However, in practical terms, the DUP embrace the 
need for a frictionless border with the Republic of Ireland and articulate a clear desire to maintain 
economic links with the European Union. Scottish Conservatives form the second distinct group.  From 
having been more or less wiped off the UK political map, they bucked the electoral trend in 2017.  
Spearheaded by Ruth Davidson, leader of the Scottish Conservatives, they added 12 additional seats to 
the single constituency they held before the election.  The basic position of the Party was much less 
hostile to the EU in Scotland than England.  Immediately after the election Davidson used her en-
hanced status to argue forcefully for a 'softer Brexit'.  Half the new Scottish Tory seats were in the 
northeast, where opposition to membership of the EU was relatively strong (note that the Remain side 
won in all Scotland's local authority areas). At least one of the new intake - Ross Thomson in Aberdeen 
South - had campaigned for Brexit.  The area has a relatively large fishing industry, in which opposi-
tion to the EU is particularly strong.  Davidson has also insisted that no compromise should be made 
on leaving the Common Fishery Policy (which is not part of the Single Market/EEA).   
 
But those minded to change course also faced difficulties.  The Conservative Manifesto pledged to 
leave the Single Market and Customs Union, while Labour’s included a commitment to ending free 
movement of people. Labour’s position is incompatible with membership of the Single Market, alt-
hough the Manifesto did not make a full commitment to ‘leaving’ it. Comments during and after the 
campaign by Jeremy Corbyn strengthened the impression that the Labour leadership was committed 
to leaving the Single Market.  His close ally, Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell, stated in terms that 
Labour would not place the issue of the single market 'on the table' of Brexit negotiations because, he 
felt, it would be inconsistent with the referendum outcome (Swinford, 2017).  McDonnell’s stance may 
reflect widespread public concern about immigration (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), shared by many 
Labour voters. Equally, the manifesto expressed concerns about treating migrants as scapegoats for 
economic and social problems (compare with Parker, 2017). 
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 After the election, other senior Labour figures sought to retrieve the possibility of retaining member-
ship of the Single Market or Customs Union (Doughty et al, 2017).  Like Conservatives pursuing similar 
policies, their position is constrained by the Manifesto on which they were elected. Labour gained 
votes disproportionately from referendum ‘Remainers’. Fully 82 per cent of the electorate supported 
parties with manifesto commitments to end free movement of people.  The Liberal Democrats and 
Scottish National Party had made retaining membership of the EU or Single Market an explicit part of 
their manifestos. The election was not perceived as a conspicuous success for either of them.   Just as 
the Parliamentary arithmetic made a Labour-led coalition impossible, there was very obviously no 
scope for a 'soft Brexit' government to be installed after the election. 
 
Re-orienting the UK state  
State capacity 
Prior to the election, Brexit’s challenge to the UK's state capacity was powerful.  There are internal and 
external dimensions to it.  Whitehall will need additional capacity for Brexit in at least four areas: 
analysis, co-ordination, legislation and implementation (Menon et al., 2017).  Analytic capacity in-
cludes the ability to develop new policy options, advise ministers on the negotiations and respond to 
EU negotiating positions.  Co-ordination is an issue across Whitehall itself but also involves more com-
plex connections with devolved administrations, local government and non-state actors, such as busi-
ness.  Through active choice or by default, Brexit may be a moment at which the State ceases to do 
some things.  That possibility, indeed, may be a big part of its attraction for libertarians.  Even so, it is 
likely to involve a substantial volume of new, complex and often contentious legislation.  Finally, after 
Brexit, the state will have to implement new policies, likely to include immigration systems and border 
checks as well as at least some new regulatory regimes.  Analysis, co-ordination and implementation 
capacity will also be needed as the UK seeks to engage externally in relation to international organisa-
tions, such as the UN (see Dee and Smith, 2017), and with other states and partners on a range of is-
sues from security and trade to the environment and climate change.   
 
The Civil Service has already been restructured, most notably through the creation of the Department 
for Exiting the EU (DExEU) and a new cabinet position of Secretary of State for International Trade.  
The purpose of creating DexEU was to mobilise the capacity to conduct the Article 50 negotiations ef-
fectively and to take advantage of emergent opportunities and new relationships.  As an EU member, 
the UK has, in effect, moved areas or aspects of policy and administration 'offshore' to Brussels, for 
example in relation to trade policy, agriculture, the environment and fisheries.  In at least some of 
these areas, we can expect an effort to reconstruct state capacity during and/or after the Brexit nego-
tiations.  
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External relationships 
Simply keeping track of any changes in the ways that other states - in Europe and around the world - 
regard post-Brexit UK is a big task (see Adler-Nissen et. al, 2017). For example, the UK's relationship 
with the USA seems set to change. Rees (2017) argued that US policies may have pushed the UK to-
wards Brexit. Wilson (2017) has detected close parallels between Trump's America and Brexit Britain.  
But both see Brexit as complicating the UK-US relationship - other things being equal, ultimately 
weakening its foundations. After Brexit, developing the UK's stance towards the US and pursuing it 
consistently and coherently across UK state agencies could prove challenging.  Perhaps recognising 
these dangers, Theresa May seemed reluctant to criticise US President Donald Trump, who threw her 
something of a lifeline by promising a ‘powerful’ UK-US free trade deal agreed ‘very quickly’ (a propo-
sition whose implausibility is one to question) at the Hamburg G20 summit within a month of May’s 
dreadful 2017 UK election performance and result.  
 
An attraction of leaving the EU is the freedom the UK could acquire to develop new trade relationships. 
The closer the UK’s involvement with the Customs Union and Single Market after Brexit, the more re-
stricted will be the additional freedoms gained of this kind. May’s invention of the Secretary of State 
for International Trade post aimed to (re)create capacity in this area.  It suggested May was predis-
posed to leave, and move decisively away from, the Single Market and Customs Union.  Equally, a pur-
ist free trade version of Brexit might make smaller demands on this new ministerial office. If the UK 
pursues the unilateral removal of tariffs and trade barriers recommended by some free trade Brex-
iteers (Minford, 2016) fewer trade experts might be needed.  For other supporters of Brexit, however, 
negotiations of this kind are the key to capturing the new opportunities offered by leaving the EU.  
Equally, in the short term the UK will need trade experts in the Article 50 negotiations, especially if a 
‘bespoke’ deal is being pursued.  So, Brexit itself may divert resources and attention from the pursuit 
of new trade opportunities.  The likely complexity of these various discussions raises the possibility 
that the UK will end up having little in the way of new arrangements in place or ready to implement as 
it leaves the EU - which could amount to a free trade exit by default.  Early signals from other parts of 
the world on new trade relationships suggest that improved access to the UK’s labour market would 
be a critical part of most possible deals (see Adler-Nissen et al., 2017).  Given the part played by anxie-
ty about immigration in motivating Brexit (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017) and May’s continuing 
commitment to reducing the UK’s net migration rate, new trade deals that involve facilitating migrant 
access to UK labour markets might not prove popular. 
 
The option of an ‘off-the-peg’ basis for negotiation is not available for foreign and security policies in 
the way it might be for the economy.  The UK is a leading European security power, and countries like 
Norway have closely structured economic relationships with the EU, but no EEA equivalents for for-
eign and security policy.  If the UK does seek to maintain ongoing security and foreign policy relation-
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ship, that will involve sustaining a significant Brussels presence in this field, co-ordinated with White-
hall and the military.  There have been some hints that the UK might deploy security capacity as a bar-
gaining chip in the wider Brexit bargaining process.  But there is also a risk of losing status in security 
policy. For example, after the 2017 general election the Sunday Times reported that the UK was ‘set to 
lose one of the most senior military commander posts in Nato … deputy supreme allied commander 
Europe … because of Brexit’ (Hookham, 2017: 20).  One of the post’s responsibilities is to command 
some EU military missions. Rees (2017) shows that UK’s relationship with the US - its the highest pro-
file, longest established partnership - has been marked by ambiguity and ambivalence.  Re-setting and 
re-building international security relationships during and after the Brexit negotiations will be a major 
undertaking (compare Dee and Smith, 2017 on Brexit and British UN diplomacy), whether the UK’s 
status is enhanced as a result of regaining sovereignty or diminished by losing leadership in Europe.  
 
Internal implications 
Negotiating the UK's exit from the EU seems likely to divert resources and attention from other White-
hall priorities.  Even so, Chalmers (2017) has argued that Brexit may further concentrate power with 
the executive at the expense of Parliament.  There are at least three other domestic domains - the UK’s 
territorial structure, its unsettled electoral politics, and political economy model - with which Brexit 
has the capacity to interact in challenging ways.  In each case, there is an underlying issue or set of is-
sues that long predates Brexit, but each of these concerns is complicated by the process and conse-
quences of the UK leaving the EU. 
 
The first concerns the UK's territorial structure and constitution.  Remain majorities in Northern Ire-
land and Scotland had already put territorial strains on the UK, enhancing the possibility that either or 
both territories might leave the UK (Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017; McHarg and Mitchell, 2017).  
After the 2017 general election, the immediate prospect of a second Scottish independence referen-
dum seemed to recede. Measured against a historical yardstick the SNP’s electoral performance was 
remarkable, winning a comfortable absolute majority of Westminster constituencies (35 from 59 seats 
- more than three times higher than its largest haul pre-2015).  However, the party had fallen back 
from its astonishing near ‘clean sweep’ result in the 2015 election, when they won all but three seats. 
The situation in Northern Ireland became even more complex (Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017).  
Without a bespoke deal to keep the Irish border flexible, May’s pre-election approach to Brexit seemed 
to increase the possibility of Northern Ireland leaving the UK and the creation of an all-Ireland state.  
Should the 2017 election result lead, in the medium term, to a Conservative administration reliant on 
DUP support, pressure will be increased on the UK government to keep the border flexible.  That might 
reduce the chances of Irish unification.  But any UK government reliant on DUP support would find it 
difficult to be - and be seen to be - impartial in dealings with the two communities and all political par-
ties in Northern Ireland.  In those circumstances, hostility and resentment from Nationalists and Re-
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publicans seems likely to grow.  After the election Conservatives at Westminster stressed their com-
mitment to ‘our United Kingdom’, but its current territorial boundaries can hardly be guaranteed.   
 
Even if the UK stays together as a state, leaving the EU will change the structures and character of de-
volution. Devolution developed in the context of the UK's EU membership, which is written through its 
practices and routines.  The EU also served as a kind of external support structure for a strikingly 
asymmetric, largely informal, weakly institutionalised form of devolution (Hunt and Minto, 2017). The 
UK has a flimsy set of structures and practices for managing the relationships among the UK and the 
devolved governments.  For example, one of the main types of forum - the Joint Ministerial Committees 
(JMCs) - have a patchy record and have met only intermittently through the history of devolution.  
That the JMCs could operate in this way reflects wider characteristics of the UK’s territorial constitu-
tion (McHarg and Mitchell, 2017): it is ambiguous and uncertain, poorly articulated and contested.  
Mutually inconsistent - centralist and devolved/decentralised - constitutional narratives have long co-
existed.  Prior to the 2017 general election McHarg and Mitchell (2017: 13) had argued that the gov-
ernment at Westminster was denying Scotland - and by extension the other devolved governments - a 
‘decisive … constitutional voice in the Brexit decision’ and that the (Great) Repeal Bill would ‘test the 
ability of the mechanisms of the political constitution to provide adequate security and voice for the 
devolved governments … in the implementation of Brexit.’  Since the election the political constitution 
has moved on.  Aspects of the Brexit decision may be re-opened and its implementation may be set on 
a somewhat different path.  Devolved actors, particularly the DUP and Scottish Conservatives, seem set 
to play a key role.  At the time of writing, it was less clear what role devolved institutions were to play 
in the processes of Brexit.   
 
Secondly, the 2016 referendum and 2017 election illustrate the unsettled state of UK electoral politics. 
Taken together, they suggest that the electorate is unwilling to provide a permissive consensus for po-
litical elites. In both events, the side with a fast-moving refractory wing – the GO Movement for Leave 
and Momentum for Labour – outperformed expectations and was perceived as ‘winning’ the campaign, 
with incumbents being punished.  Although the election generated a remarkably strong overall result 
for the two largest parties, it was not a return to the perceived status quo ante of class politics. In-
creasingly, electoral experts have adopted valence politics perspectives.  But both the referendum and 
general election were polarising events.  Neither was a competition about competence with a shared 
or convergent agenda. The absence of a strategy to secure consent from the referendum’s losing side 
after July 2016 may have entrenched the polarisation.  Equally, both the Labour and Conservative par-
ties and their traditional electorates display deep divisions over the EU.  The EU issue cuts across his-
toric patterns of party loyalty. 
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Both electoral events also revealed electoral divergences between the UK’s nations and territories. The 
dynamics of the English electorate provided an important source of volatility in these votes.  In 2016 
English identity was linked to support for Brexit (Henderson et al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2018).  It is 
not clear that any party managed to mobilise this potential electorate in 2017, although UKIP sought to 
present itself as an English party.  A tangible, but still somewhat latent, politics of England lies under 
the dynamics of Brexit.  And English politics could interact with distinctive processes in each of the 
other three territories, making the UK’s multi-national union more fragile.  The election and its after-
math – particularly the governing arrangement between the Conservatives and the DUP – dramatised 
this fragility.   
 
Third, Brexit has complex implications for the UK’s political economy.  Some on the right see leaving 
the EU as an opportunity to implement a free trade minimalist state.  Leaving the EU without an 
agreement might generate this position by default.  Had Remain won the referendum, the UK political 
economy status quo might have been maintained, despite being marked by long-standing wicked 
problems.  But May’s pre-election position differed from both. It mixed social and economic interven-
tionism with fiscal austerity and support for leaving the Single Market/Customs Union.  May’s stance 
suggested that the UK economy was unbalanced, unfair and socially unsustainable.  The 2017 election 
result may have indicated that much of the UK electorate agreed with her.   
 
Painting in broad brushstrokes, the UK economy and public finances have been sustained by dynamic 
and lucrative financial services together with a buoyant housing market and confident consumers.  
The dynamism is concentrated in a few places - with London and the Southeast of England predomi-
nant.  Outside London, university towns and cities with diverse, well-educated, younger populations 
perform relatively well economically.  Yet the young people who contribute to their dynamism often 
find housing costs are prohibitive in these places.  Moreover, the UK’s level of per capita productivity 
has remained stubbornly low for generations, apparently impervious to corrective policies.  Had en-
hancing worker productivity in the UK been a less painful process, migration might not have become 
as important to UK economic growth.  Where economic growth is not driven by productivity im-
provements, it hinges on increasing the size of the labour force.  As well as filling skills gaps of various 
kinds, immigration has been a quick way of enlarging the UK’s labour force.   
 
So the political economy context for Brexit negotiations mixes long-standing wicked problems and 
challenging dilemmas.  The UK’s productivity disease falls into the first category, as do problems with 
housing - both were Economic and Social Research Council (the major UK social research funder) pri-
ority areas from 2015.  Sustaining the UK’s economy and avoiding damage to its public finances re-
quire that the financial service sector and house prices remain buoyant, each of which tends to rein-
force the dominance of London and the Southeast of England.  If Brexit weakens the City of London, 
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that might lead to a territorial re-balancing of the UK economy, perhaps on the back of a painful eco-
nomic downturn.  If territorial rebalancing is achievable in the context of London-based financial ser-
vices retaining their current character, it seems likely to be a slow process.   
 
Parker’s ‘progressive’s dilemma’ (2017) is thrown up by the perception that immigration undercuts 
social provision.   But an open migration regime may have become structured into the UK’s growth 
regime (Thompson, 2017). As a result, if leaving the EU means restricting immigration, the UK may 
find itself in the obverse situation.  Polls indicate that a large majority of the UK population sees immi-
gration as a problem, but if any resulting migration restrictions undercut growth, the UK might find 
itself caught in the ‘Brexiteers’ dilemma’. Finally, reducing immigration may also pose social challeng-
es, particularly in diverse urban communities where significant population segments share Parker’s 
rejection of the progressive’s dilemma.  Labour won unexpected 2017 victories in constituencies like 
Bristol North West, Canterbury and Kensington.  In places like these, with large young and student 
populations and Remain majorities in 2016, restricting or reversing migration may be socially disrup-
tive.  
 
Conclusion 
Brexit may open new economic opportunities for the UK.  Whether it does could hinge on the pre-exit 
strength of the economy.  The stronger the economy, the more likely the UK is to prosper after leaving 
the EU – although for some free traders Brexit may trigger a bracing process of economic restructur-
ing.  By contrast May’s Industrial Strategy suggests her concern about UK economy weaknesses, which 
make Brexit more challenging, and may be exacerbated by it (for example, by restricting the supply of 
immigrant labour).  The Strategy is her proposed solution to the Brexiteers’ dilemma.   
 
Equally, Brexit has revealed, and possibly deepened, problems with UK-level political processes.  
Westminster has not engaged effectively with EU regulatory processes, and Brexit may marginalise UK 
representative democracy further, as and if the UK executive dominates successor regulatory process-
es (Chalmers, 2017).  While a soft Brexit might be attractive to (erstwhile) Remainers on economic 
grounds, it would have a deleterious impact on UK democracy and accountability: that is the dilemma 
they face.  The UK’s territorial constitution appears fragile.  Electoral politics seem volatile and unset-
tled – notably so in the hitherto neglected Anglo-British core of the UK state (Henderson et al., 2016).  
The social foundations of mass democracy are not what we once thought they were, posing difficult 
issues for both Labour and the Conservatives. 
 
So, the view of Brexit as ‘historic’ notwithstanding, challenging continuities may significantly shape the 
UK’s future economic and politics prospects.  Reconciling immigration control with frictionless access 
to the EU economy – two objectives which command majority public support - is an overarching chal-
16 
lenge. The UK government’s vision of a deep, special bespoke arrangement was dreamt up to reconcile 
this Brexit dilemma. But Europeans seem reluctant to cooperate in this tailoring project. If there is a 
change of PM or government and so the Article 50 negotiations have to be reset, there may not be time 
to negotiate a bespoke agreement.  The only possibility might be more limited adjustments to an off-
the-peg deal. 
 
Brexit feels ‘historic’, but so far little seems to have been settled.  The choices that will come to be seen 
as defining the UK’s future may have already been made.  Equally, there is sense of events running fast, 
too quickly to be fully understood or brought under political control. In short, it feels more like muddle 
than a new era.  But perhaps that is how the early stage of a new age feels.   
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